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1. Workers’ participation in the firm management as 
integration of subordination and industrial democracy. 
Usually, board-level worker representation is a topic discussed in the 
context of legal reflection on the governance structure of companies, and, 
therefore, more from the point of view of corporate law than of labour law 
(so, for example, in Denmark, Germany, and in the EU’slegal framework). 
Without in any way willing to part from this traditional perspective, in this 
chapter I would like to develop some arguments in favour of the 
participation from a perspective that privileges the individual right of 
workers, by freely developing certain elements of reflection drawn from 
moral philosophy, and in particular from the idea of “social freedom” as 
elaborated by Axel Honnet1, and of “non-domination” as theorized in the 
neo-republican thought by Philip Pettit2, to which is added the important 
contribution of Amartya Sen on the “capabilities” as an expression of the 
freedom of people in acquiring important functioning. I believe that these 
currents of philosophical-moral thought can usefully be mobilized in a 
convergent perspective, in which board-level worker participation 
represents the outcome of a process of revisiting the assumptions of 
traditional labour law, so that the employment relationship is the 
expression of a structure of domination (the capitalist firm) which 
necessarily limits the freedom (negative and positive) of the worker, and 
which identifies in the conflict between capital and labour the only horizon 
in which the values of the respective (social and economic)spheres find 
some precarious and transitory moments of composition. I believe that by 
adopting this traditional perspective - which is still very widespread in the 
doctrine of labour law - the possibility of promoting the participation of 
workers in the management of the company is greatly limited, even on the 
political-institutional level, whether it is considered as the natural and 
intrinsic outcome of social freedom achieved in the main spheres of human 
life (described in Hegel’s philosophy of law: the affective relationships, the 
market and the democratic state), whether we consider it an extrinsic legal 
construction with respect to a capitalist dynamics governed by a purely 
individualistic rationality based on exploitation, according to Marxian 
reading. 
If, as Honnet believes, in modern times there is an intrinsic social 
normativity of the economic sphere (compared to previous historical eras) 
                                                        
1  A. Honnet, Freedom’s Rights. The Social Foundations of Democratic Life, Columbia 
University Press, 2014 (french translation A. Honnet, Le droit de la liberté. Esquisse d'une 
éthicité démocratique, Gallimard, Paris, 2015). 
2 P. Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford University Press, 
1997. 
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capable of reuniting the idea of freedom with that of justice, and if, on the 
other hand, freedom and social justice are conceptualized as conditions 
that demand “non-domination” in a private bilateral relationship, a space 
is opened to revisit the theory of the employment relationship as a relation 
of subordination, which obviously is linked to the different conceptions of 
the firm and its governance in democratic terms advocated by the theorists 
of industrial democracy. In essence, a new perspective is opened in order 
to consider the employment relationship in a way different from that 
described by the great twentieth-century sociology at the dawn of the 
Fordist era, that is, in terms of the full subjection of the worker to the 
domain of the entrepreneur. Furthermore, we get to have a new space 
where to rethink both the scope of the economic domination and the 
structure of the labour market, and, finally, the strategic role of the labour 
factor in the organizational dimension of productive activity.  
Participation becomes an evolutionary model capable of modifying at 
its root the domination-based framework within the context of a specific 
employment relationship, redefining the very notion of subordination: 
subordination and industrial democracy together represent the terms of 
the employment relationship3 and together they project themselves into 
the dimension of enterprise as coexisting and functional factors for the 
achievement of social freedom. As the participation of workers in the 
enterprise is realized through the law that interferes with the 
arrangements, the rights and obligations governing the private 
relationship, this path obviously breaks the orthodox-liberal conception of 
freedom of contract to the extent that, as we shall see, the participation of 
workers in the management of the firm can be conceived as an individual 
right related to “employment conditions”. This contravenes both the 
classical (and neoclassical) liberal vision that attributes an absolute value 
to individual contractual autonomy, and to the “standard” economic vision 
that considers that private ordering is more economically efficient than 
state-sanctioned rules4. 
2. Subordination and Participation. 
The employment contract, with which the firm acquires a factor of 
production necessary for productive activity, represents the paradigm of 
the modern subjection of a person to the juridical, economic and social 
power of others. Although rationalized in contractual terms and subjected 
to more or less penetrating limits by labour law, the original power of the 
                                                        
3 M. Pedrazzoli, Democrazia industriale e subordinazione, Giuffrè, Milan, 1985. 
4 See O. E. Williamson, The Lens of Contract: Private Ordering, 92 (2) Am. Ec. Rewv. 438, 
2002. 
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entrepreneur flows directly into the employment relationship, consecrating 
the asymmetry of the parties' subjective legal positions as they are 
functional to the development of the company. Whether it is the exercise 
of authority in order to reduce the “transaction costs” typical of the market 
(Coase) or simply to impose the “domination of the will” of the 
entrepreneur on the one who is forced to live for selling one's labour force 
on the market (Marx), in the capitalist firm that situation is determined by 
what JJ Rousseau, in pre-republican France, described in these terms: “in 
the relation between man and the worse that can happen to one another 
to the other's discretion”. This peculiarity of the employment relationship 
is masterfully represented in the Weberian fresco on the contractual 
society, which highlights the logical-juridical connection between the 
autonomy of regulated authorization through legal schemes, the reduction 
of constraints and the increase of individualistic freedom5. According to 
Weber, the possibility of entering into contractual relationships with others 
and the possibility of choosing between an ever greater number of schemes 
- which the law makes available for “association”, in the broadest sense of 
the word - is in modern law enormously increased compared to the past, 
at least in the field of the exchange of goods, personal work and the 
provision of services. But the consequent decentralization of legal 
production through negotiating autonomy does not always increase the 
total of freedom within a given legal community: in the case of the 
employment relationship, the free will of those interested in the labour 
market allows people to submit to to the “conditions set by the 
economically strongest subject by virtue of his possession guaranteed by 
law”. Which is to say that the principle of “coactus voluit” in the legal order 
based on the private ownership of the means of production determines de 
facto a coercion exercised as manifestation of power in the market 
struggle. 
The tendency of modern law towards a contractual society therefore 
raises the question whether contractual autonomy has in practice had the 
result of increasing the freedom of the individual to determine the 
conditions of his existence beyond the purely formal aspects, or if instead, 
despite this - or perhaps partly because of this - the tendency towards a 
coercive schematization of existence has been accentuated. The answer to 
this fundamental question cannot be decided only on the basis of the 
development of juridical forms, since the greatest formal variety of the 
accepted contractual schemes, and even the formal authorization to 
                                                        
5 M. Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 2, Chapter VIII, Economy and law (Sociology of law), 
University of California Press, 1978, p. 666 ff. 
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arbitrarily determine the content of a contract, do not absolutely guarantee 
that these formal possibilities are accessible to all. 
The possibility of increasing freedom is hindered by the differentiation 
of the effective distribution of possession, ensured by the legal system. 
And here we come to the point that most involves labour law and the theory 
of worker participation in corporate governance. According to Weber, a 
formal right of a worker to enter into a contract of any content with any 
entrepreneur practically does not imply that workers in search of 
employment have the slightest freedom to determine their working 
conditions, and in itself, such right does not guarantee any influence in this 
regard; on the contrary, the possibility for the most powerful on the market 
- in this case, normally, the entrepreneur - to fix those conditions at his 
will and offer them to the worker in search of work so that he accepts them 
or refuses them, is transformed - given the greater economic urgency of 
the need of job seekers - into unilateral power. The result of contractual 
freedom therefore consists in having the owners of the capitalist enterprise 
acquiring a power over the others, ultimately favoring their autonomy and 
their position of power. 
This secularized vision of the privatistic myth of contractual private 
autonomy reaches us, after having represented for over a century the 
figure of the labour contract as an instrument of coercion - and not of 
emancipation - of the worker, and the enterprise as an elective place of 
exercise of the unilateral power of man over man. On closer inspection, 
then, this conception of the worker as coactus voluit finds its natural 
counterpoint in the socialist ideal that aims at achieving social freedom in 
the economic sphere, that is a change in the institutional organization of 
society aimed at producing emancipation from the limitations that hinder 
the equal participation of all subjects in the process of social self-
constitution 6 . The ideology of the “free” labour contract that actually 
favours a noticeable accentuation of coercion through purely personal 
claims will make it possible to transform the relations of personal and 
authoritarian subordination typical of the capitalist enterprise into objects 
of exchange on the labour market. 
The reproduction of this model, which violates every actual 
subjectivation in the context of the contract, realizes a sort of labour law 
"objectification" of the worker as the subject without any real possibility of 
realizing, through the contract, his own freedom; and since individuals or 
groups are objectively defined not only by what they are, but also by what 
they are considered to be, by a perceived being that, although strictly 
                                                        
6 A. Honnet, Die Idee des Sozialismus, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 2015. 
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dependent on their being, is never totally referrable to it7, labour law has 
perpetuated on the level of having to be this perception of subjugation by 
translating it into a sort of "distinctive property" of the employee, linked to 
his "status"8. 
A century after the Weberian analysis of the contractual society, labour 
law still questions the techniques capable of balancing the relationship 
between worker and employer. Above all, labour law is constantly seeking 
a theoretical and practical legitimacy to establish itself and, at the same 
time, a more cooperative and democratic vision of the work relationship: 
a relationship in which the elements of subordination, of domination and 
of dependence create space for man's social freedom in the workplace. It 
is time to rethink the notion of subordination and the worker as a coactus 
voluit, who is denied the right to participate in the decisions concerning 
their work relationship, the organization of work, and the strategic choices 
of the firm to which he, with his work, contributes. It is time to reconsider 
subordination as an expression of the unconditional domination of the 
worker in the workplace, which executes the will of the employer and 
cannot enter into the merits of the unilateral decisions that the company 
adopts. Worker participation is the horizon of a subordination that becomes 
collaboration, which involves the worker in the destiny of the firm, and 
which ultimately puts the value of the person back at the center of 
production, in the context of an equal participation of all the subjects in 
the process of social self-constitution 9 . In summary: while the "free" 
employment contract has allowed the transformation of the relations of 
personal subordination typical of the capitalist enterprise into objects of 
exchange on the labor market, participation inserts a decisive element of 
democracy in the relationship, balancing it in a collaborative and non-
authoritarian way. If it is true that the employment relationship, unlike 
discrete market transactions, is a “governance structure”, the participation 
of workers in the management of the business simply makes this 
governance more democratic. 
 
 
                                                        
7 P. Bourdieu, Le Sens pratique, Les Éditions de minuit, Paris, 1980 
8 See B. Veneziani, The Evolution of the Contract of Employment, in B. Hepple (ed.), in The 
Making of Labour Law in Europe, Mansell Publishing Limited, London and New York, 1986, p. 
33, according to which “the movement from status to contract was never completed”. 
9 See A. Honnet, Die Idee des Sozialismus. 
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3. The participation of workers in the Firm 
management, between capabilities and non-
domination. 
Although still today the Weberian vision can be said to be dominant in 
the representation that labour law has of contractual freedom, the 
evolution of democratic societies in a personalistic sense allows us to 
consider in a new light the matter of autonomy and authority guaranteed 
by the law in the contractual society, with reference both to the 
employment relationship and to the corporate governance. 
First of all, a bundle of changes affects the capitalist industrial 
enterprise, which in its post-Fordist evolution seems to rely less and less 
on the discipline and the authoritarian coercion, although the macro-
models of “empires” and “pyramids” are widely present also in the current 
neocapitalist phase10, which is also characterized by a pervasive planning 
of behaviour even outside of strictly subordinate work11. But a fundamental 
change seems to concern the social paradigm as a whole, which after the 
eclipse of the typical subject of postmodern culture, lies precisely on that 
subject: no longer an abstract but a concrete subject, "constitutionalized" 
and imbued with a cultural experience and identity that becomes a channel 
through which to convey the founding values of the legal system. 
In this new dimension of subjectivity, the Weberian theme of 
contractual freedom takes on an unprecedented rationalizing value: on the 
one hand, because one can perceive, among the meshes of a conception 
of the firm and of the relations of production, certainly irreducible to the 
twentieth-century scheme of the steel cage, what Weber already indicated 
as a possible "qualitative differentiation" of coercion and its distribution 
among the subjects from time to time participating in the legal community; 
on the other hand, because subjectivation, once embedded in the juridical-
systematic coordinates that brought the capitalist organization of labour 
back to principles that are much more democratic than those that the 
Author of Economy and Society had in mind, does not necessarily reflect 
the coactus voluit, and above all it becomes a possible alternative vehicle 
for the penetration, even in the employment relationship, of individual and 
universal values and rights12. 
Subjectification can therefore represent a regulatory horizon that is 
partly free from the risks of domination implemented through negotiating 
                                                        
10 P. Perulli, Dopo il capitalismo, in A. Perulli, a cura di, Lavoro autonomo e capitalismo delle 
piattaforme, Kluwer-Cedam, Milano, 2018 
11 See A. Supiot, Au-delà de l’emploi. Transformation du travail et devenir du droit du travail 
en Europe, Flammarion, Paris, 1999. 
12 See A. Touraine, Nous, sujets humains, Seuil, 2013. 
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autonomy, typical of the authorization schemes described by Weber. On 
the contrary, it, if correctly conveyed and functionalized by normative 
devices, should constitute a vector of appropriation and strengthening of 
individual capacities, of the defense of the self identified with the 
satisfaction of the needs of the subject and the increase of his/her 
capabilities understood as a kind of substantial freedom to acquire 
alternative combinations of operations. 
This renewed attention to the freedom of the subject is a constant of 
post-positivist philosophical-juridical critical reflection. A renowned jurist 
as Franz Neumann, half a century before Sen's theory of capabilities, wrote 
that “civil-social rights” are indispensable for the realization of freedom, 
but they do not exhaust all freedom, being simply one of their elements: 
freedom is something more than the defense of rights against power, it 
also implies the possibility of developing the full potential of the human 
being13. This vision of freedom as individual freedom not only from coercion 
(negative freedom) but also as a faculty of acting in accordance with one's 
own interests (positive freedom) makes it possible to reconsider in more 
articulated terms the topic of regulatory intervention and its aims, which 
concern to a greater extent the worker protection (his negative freedom) 
and less the promotion of his position as a contracting party capable of 
negotiating in terms of equality (his positive freedom). To such a greater 
extent that it has been written that only the democratization of work and 
the cooperative participation of the subject in the control of his own activity 
will be able to dissolve the alleys of status and to consider the worker a 
contractually mature figure in the true sense of the term. 
Unlike classical liberal individualism, which eliminates the social 
content of the self and reflects a purely market-oriented logic, the 
development of subjective freedom to acquire alternatives to operations is 
not the result of the individual's legal-contractual capacity isolated on a 
self-regulated market. The acquisition of capabilities is the result of the 
necessary intervention of legal institutions, aimed at promoting the active 
development of individual and collective freedoms14.  
                                                        
13 Franz L. Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, in Columbia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 
7 (Nov., 1953), pp. 901 ff.  
14 S. Deakin, Capacitas: Contract law, capabilities and the Legal Foundations of the Market, 
in S. Deakin and A. Supiot, Capacitas. Contract law and the Institutional Preconditions of a 
Market Economy, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2009; S. Deakin, Economic 
Approaches to the Evaluation of Labour Law: Comparing Coase, Hayek and Sen, in A. Lyon-
Caen-A. Perulli (eds) Efficacia e diritto del lavoro, Cedam, Padova, 2008, p. 45 ff. On the 
approach of capabilities applied to labor law see R. Del Punta, Labour Law and 
the Capability Approach (2016) 32 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
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Moreover, as Sen pointed out, individual freedom is not only a central 
social value, but also an inseparable social product, which implies precise 
choices of social institutions and public policies15. If individuals do not 
pursue their only limited personal interest, but, as social persons, they 
have broader values and goals that include understanding for others and a 
commitment to ethical norms, then the promotion of social justice can be 
pursued with greater chances, without clashing into the pessimistic 
consideration according to which the conflicts of interest of the subjects 
(understood as rigid maximizers of limited personal interests) prevail over 
the pursuit of social values16. 
This perspective of regulatory enhancement of individual capacities is 
well suited to the idea of worker participation in corporate governance, 
which is based on a strong axiological basis, which is that of social freedom. 
While respecting individual interests of the subject, participation does not 
so much designate the action of an actor selfishly devoted to himself (as 
in the traditional representation of the employment relationship), but 
above all, it reflects the penetrating action of the idea of social subject in 
individuals, transforming them in actors of liberating changes, with the 
help of institutions in their turn modified by laws inspired by fundamental 
human rights. 
This tension towards the creation of individual capacities requires 
institutional vectors capable of transforming abstract principles into 
effective rules: in the theory of capabilities the problem consists in the 
translation of subjective preferences into substantial freedoms - that is to 
say in individual capacities - through a series of “conversion factors” 
operating at different levels 17 . Among these conversion factors, the 
organizational and life context of people, together with social and legal 
norms, play an essential role, so that the participation of workers should 
act as a factor of concretization / conversion to support the creation of 
capacity for the worker in the specific business context and, therefore, to 
implement concrete forms of democratization of the employment 
relationship. 
Board-level workers participation should, in short, be part of a 
systemic project consisting in promoting substantial freedom in the 
workplace and in ensuring that each person can best fulfill him/herself in 
                                                        
Industrial Relations, Issue 4, p.383 ff.; B. Langille (ed), The Capability Approach to Labour 
Law, OUP, 2019 
15 See A. Sen, La libertà individuale come impegno sociale, Laterza, Bari-Roma, 2007, p. 39 
16 A. Sen, La libertà individuale come impegno sociale, cit., p.41 
17A. Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, in Journal of Human Development , Volume 6, 2005 
- Issue 2 
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the performance of tasks useful to him/herself and others18. In the current 
phase, labour law is undergoing changes in its levels of protection and its 
its own objectives (if not its values): therefore, the participation of workers 
can be a useful tool to make sense of the employment relationship in a 
direction that can bring together the efforts to redefine a social citizenship 
increasingly threatened by the deconstruction of the social rights and 
solidarity typical of the industrial era19. This is a perspective that is widely 
present in the legal systems of many European states (see below), yet not 
adequately valued, especially if it is considered in the light of the economic 
theories of the firm, tied to an individualistic-proprietary vision and 
refractory to any social review. In reality, the realization of a different 
conception of the firm paves the way for the construction of new bonds of 
solidarity in the places of production, such as to relaunch the aspiration, to 
which labour law has certainly contributed, to realize social freedom in the 
economic sphere: a conception in which individual freedom is rethought in 
a sense of solidarity, and the realization of one’s own goals of freedom is 
not incardinated in the single person but in the community of solidarity. 
To fully realize this project it is necessary not only to develop limits to 
the entrepreneur’s power (according to the tradition of labour law) but 
above all to guarantee forms of intervention on the part of the workers in 
the strategic decisions of the company. A powerful theoretical indication 
that justifies this perspective can be traced in the neo-republican doctrine 
and in particular in the conception of non-domination as consitutuive of 
freedom. In this perspective, a legal system that is consistent with freedom 
ought to embed procedural protections for its citizens vertically facing the 
State, but also in respect of private social relationship, and in particular in 
the relationship between worker and entrepreneur 20 . Republicanism 
demands, as regards the State and political sphere, not only that citizens 
have the resilient right to question decisions, but also the resilient rights 
to jointly share in influence and control over decision-making so as to 
prevent uncontrolled interference and thereby legitimate the collective 
order itself. By “influence” Pettit intends the shared right and ability to 
contribute to decision-making; by “control”, he intends the shared rights 
to contribute to decision-making plus the capacity to impose a direction on 
decision making processes. However, if joint influence and control are what 
                                                        
18 See A. Supiot, Préface à la seconde édition (2016), in A. Supiot, sous la direction de, Au-
delà de l’emploi, Flammarion, Paris, 2016, p. XXIX. 
19 See A. Supiot, En guise de conclusion: la capacité, une notion à haut potentiel, in S. Deakin, 
A. Supiot, Capacitas. Contract Law and the Insitutional Preconditions of a Market Economy, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2009, p. 162. 
20  See D. Cabrelli & R. Zahn, Theories of Domination and labour Law: An Alternative 
Conception for Intervention?, in Int. Jour. Of Comp. Lab.Law, 2017, p. 339 ff. 
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make us free in terms of non domination at the political level, we should 
benefit from a similar staus as free and equal people in other major spheres 
of life: this is because the domination we can suffer in these spheres is no 
less substantial than the domination we are vulnerable to in political 
relationships. If we accept these points, the perspective that naturally 
opens up consists in applying these concepts of influence and control 
typical of the relationship between the citizen and the State, to the 
relationship between the worker-citizen and the firm.  
Other mechanisms indicated by neo-republican theorists, such as a 
basic income that allows the worker to change employer, or a legal 
discipline of the employment relationship capable of eliminating arbitrary 
interference, or, again, a right to challenge decisions which concern the 
interests of workers, although thay are all necessary with a view to 
democratizing the employment relationship, they are not sufficient, 
because they do not guarantee the worker participation in the decision-
making process of the company21. 
The forms of industrial democracy and corporate governance in which 
there is fair shared control among employees, managers, and owners, so 
that the workers participate in the decision-making processes on matters 
concerning work, productive investments, changes and the strategies of 
the company, therefore represent a natural outcome of the theory of non-
domination applied to the employment relationship. 
4. Firm, autonomy and legitimacy. 
The firm, with its economic imperatives (not only of productivity and 
profit, but of valuing stock and share capital), stands out in contemporary 
society as an (social, economic, political) actor increasingly independent 
from the political-juridical sphere and at the same time more and more 
legitimized by the economic “tyranny of values” that guides the orientation 
of social communities. However, the autonomy gradually acquired by the 
firm in the neo-liberal context, and its not only juridical-formal, but, above 
all, social legitimation, are based on a fundamental contradiction, which 
the economic and juridical analysis fail to grasp. The firm is not in fact a 
politically neutral actor, and not so much because its structure is regulated 
by juridical-state mechanisms, but because it participates - like other social 
actors, including the State - in the logical and moral integration of the 
world, so that its legitimacy cannot be separated from its overall social 
                                                        
21  See S. Blanc, La codétermination dans deux courants de la philosophie politique 
contemporaine: le liberalisme-égalitaire rawlsien et le néo-républicanisme, being published 
in O. Favareau (ed), Traité de codetérmination, Presses de l'Université Laval, Quebec City, 
Canada, 2019 
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function, from the function of transforming the world through collective 
creation22. The analysis of the economic-legal matrix is not aware of this 
fundamental profile of the company, which is conceived as a nexus of 
contract, if not even more simply (and immaterially) as a “production 
function”. 
In the legal field, only labour law has functioned as a (more or less 
effective) normative instrument of capitalist rationalization of the 
company, contrasting the pure egoistic and utilitarian logic of the homo 
oeconomicus, through important mechanisms of conditioning of corporate 
rationality and providing to the firm its not only formally, but also 
organizational and social, legal consistency. 
There are two perspectives historically cultivated by labour law. On the 
one hand, a power of control or conditioning of the entrepreneur's choices 
that is exercised from outside the decision-making process. On the other 
hand, the Rhenish variant of a capitalism based on the participation of 
workers in the supervisory boards of large companies, allowing workers to 
influence the entrepreneur's economic and social decisions from within. 
Even in other European countries, such as Italy, the participation of 
workers in the management of companies was placed at the base of the 
legal and social order drawn up by the Constitution (Article 46 of the 
Constitution), even if the implementation of industrial democracy was not 
implemented according to the model provided by the Constitution. 
This scenario began to change progressively towards the end of the 
last century, and the deep roots of this change have been identified in a 
series of vectors, ranging from restructuring processes rethought in a 
transnational key to reticular organizational structures in continuous 
fibrillation, up to the model of financialization in which the managers 
themselves are selected more because of “objective” financial knowledge 
than on the basis of traditional values23. 
Today, albeit with many contradictions, that cycle seems to have been 
completed, and unfortunately with results that are far more problematic 
than those underlying a mere reorganization of the corporate governance 
structure. Faced with the financialization of capital on a global scale, the 
processes of dematerialization of the company, the extreme mobility of 
capital and the planetary fragmentation of production chains and value, 
one must wonder about not only what role labour law can still play in the 
face of the impracticability of the Fordist compromise, but also what 
residual function of labour law in the dominant view of the shareholder 
                                                        
22 Cfr. P. Bourdieu, Sur l’état, Cours au Collége de France 1989-1990, Seuil, 2012, cours du 
18 janvier 1990. 
23 R. Dore, Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism. Japan and Germany versus the 
Anglo-Saxons, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. 
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value, of the employment relationship reduced to the agency costs scheme, 
of the re-emergence of "community" visions with ambiguous aims of social 
legitimacy. 
Faced with these processes, is there still room for a social-moral vision 
of capitalism or should we accept what Axel Honnet called his “distorted 
development”24? And what about the company: is it conceivable that it 
should be constitutionalized in a social and societal sense? Can the 
economy itself offer a platform for labour law in the reconstruction of a 
market and business theory that does not exclude the social contribution 
of regulation? 
The benefits and advantages of such a perspective, in which a new 
paradigm faces the scene to govern social processes and is not engulfed 
by them, are many. As the German model of codetermination teaches, the 
advantages of worker participation range from the absorption of social 
conflicts to the motivation of workers and the increase in productivity, from 
the social legitimacy of managerial decisions that favours long-term 
strategies to the possibility of asserting interests of the whole company, 
even at the levels of investment decision and financing intentions25. It is, 
in short, a culture of cooperative modernization which, although German 
participation is the result of a specific historical, cultural and institutional 
context, can (and it actually is) be practiced in many other juridical 
systems, and can become a possible project, to be relaunched at European 
level. 
5. Worker participation as an expression of social 
freedom. 
In 1977 the labour lawyer Otto Kahn-Freund spoke out against the 
participation of workers in company boards as recommended in those years 
by the Bullok report26. The thesis of the renowned jurist consisted in the 
pluralism of values and in the ineliminable conflict of interests in industrial 
relations; participation would in fact have implied a potential prejudice to 
trade union autonomy, in the sense that it would have denied the very 
clear division in the pluralist analysis between the management function to 
effectively manage the trade union function independently. 
                                                        
24 Cfr. A. Honnet, Le droit de la liberté. Esquisse d'une éthicité démocratique, Gallimard, Paris, 
2015 
25 See M. Weiss, Workers Participation in the Enterprise in Germany, in A. Perulli & T. Treu 
(eds), Enterprise and Social Rights, Wolters Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands, 
2017, p. 293 ff. 
26O. Kahn-Freund, Industrial Democracy, in Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 6, 1, 1977, p. 65 ff; 
see also Labour and the Law, Stevens&Sons Ltd, 1977. 
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For other but converging reasons, board level employee participation 
was also excluded from the economic theory of the firm and in particular 
from the agency theory, according to which the sharing of control of the 
company between workers and shareholders would not be legitimate 
because the workers are not the residual claimant with decision-making 
power, nor would such participation be effective because it would diminish 
the supervision of the controllers in the principal-agent relationship27. 
It is therefore necessary to think about the market, the business and 
labour relations differently, recovering a moral and social vision of the firm 
as an institution of social freedom. According to Honnet, social freedom is 
closely related to the institutional dimension and to the idea of mutual 
recognition that lives in the ethical-moral dimension of the market through 
a normative functionalism that, according to a line of thought that leads 
from Hegel to Durkheim and Polanyi, is capable to legitimize the market 
by forcing all actors to follow principles of fairness and justice28. 
The conditions for achieving social freedom in the context of the 
market economy are the following: first, “the purely individual self-interest 
constitutive of market behaviour must be able to fulfil the normative 
condition that all participants can understand as a suitable means for the 
complementary realization of their own respective purposes”; second, 
market institutions must “institutionally reflect these underlying claims to 
social freedom, thus ensuring that the participants remain aware of these 
claims”; third, “(e)xpressed in terms of recognition, this means that 
economic actors must have recognized each other as members of a 
cooperative community before they can grant each other the right to 
maximise individual utility”29.  
This last step, that directly regards the philosophical and normative 
theme of the recognition, is very important for the legitimization of the 
board level employee representation both from the point of view of the 
theory of the firm and from the point of view of the employment 
relationship. In general theoretical terms, participation is certainly an 
expression of recognition as a historical form of human intersubjectivity, 
that is – in a Hegelian way - a real institution where subjects mutually limit 
each other's selfish interests and, in such institution, they manifest their 
mutual recognition as beings endowed with equal dignity and freedom30. 
                                                        
27  See B. Segrestin, S. Vernac, Gouvernement, Participation et Mission de l’Entreprise, 
Hermann, 2018, p. 58; see also B. Roger (éd.) L’entreprise, formes de la propriété et 
responsabilités sociales, Collége des Bernardins, 2012, p. 42 s. 
28 A. Honnet, Freedom’s Right, p. 183 
29 A. Honnet, Freedom’s Right, pp. 191-192 
30 See A. Honnet, Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice , in Acta 
Sociologica, Vol. 47, No. 4, (Dec., 2004), pp. 351-364 
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From this last perspective it is clear that the participation of workers 
represents a device capable of rebalancing the status of subordination to 
the extent that the coordination of individuals can be successful only if they 
“recognize each other not only legally as parties of a contract but also 
morally or ethically as members of a cooperative community”31. The first 
condition, related to the fact that the actors’ behaviour on the market 
should lead to social freedom, is more problematic, since Honnet’s 
reference is here to the concept of “corporations” that appears in Hegel’s 
Philosophy of law: in fact, following Hegel, in the corporations the subjects 
see themselves as engaged in social cooperation, and solidarity requires 
discursive mechanisms of formation of will that cannot be reduced to 
economic rationality. In the Hegelian perspective corporations are 
“professional associations” of which individuals are members in virtue of 
their particular skill and profession, and they are part of civil society: 
corporations regulate these professions and protect their members against 
the contingecies of life32. It was therefore opposed to Honnet's analysis 
that the firm (and the market) do not know the solidarity mechanisms 
typical of corporations, and this was because market mechanism and 
discursive mechanisms of will formation are alternative, and sometimes 
competing, mechanisms of action coordination33. Consequently, in the 
economic activity of the market, as in the behaviour of the company, there 
would be no intrinsic structure capable of ensuring the development of 
social freedom, but only external limits coming from the State. 
Put in these terms, critical analysis does not capture the constitutive 
and regulatory function of law within the institutions of the capitalist 
economy, namely the market and the enterprise. In reality, the firm and 
the market are institutions to which the legal system refers as intrinsic 
solidarity mechanisms (because they are constitutive) and not only 
extrinsic, as both are embedded in an ethical framework provided by legal 
norms. The legal systems that practice codermination therefore achieve 
social freedom in the sphere of labour through discursive mechanisms with 
which workers can deploy their cooperative activity. Social freedom 
requires that all participants in the labour market be able to carry out a 
cooperative activity in view of a common good that transcends the strategic 
and selfish behaviour of the actors, and for this they must be placed in a 
position to influence the business decisions, both strategic and those 
related to work organization: the first because they concern the 
development of the firm as a social institution, the second because they 
                                                        
31 A. Honnet, Freedom’s Right, p. 182. 
32 G. W. Hegel, Elements of thePhilosophy of Right, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 255A 
33 See T. Jütten, Is the market a Sphere of Social Freedom?, in Critical Horizons, Vol. 16, No. 
2, May 2015, p. 195 
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contribute to the “humanization of work” that constitutes, together with 
the discursive mechanisms of cooperation, the second regulatory 
prerequisite for achieving social freedom34. 
This view was opposed to co-determination because in reality it 
recognizes the power relations between employee and employer and allows 
each of the parties to realize their respective egoistic interest (consisting 
for the workers in gaining a certain degree of influence in the decision-
making processes, for the entrepreneur the benefit of industrial peace)35. 
In this way, therefore, a real cooperative activity where both parties 
deliberate about the cooperative pursuit of shared aims, thus achieving 
social freedom, would not take place. But this criticism does not appear 
convincing, because, in conceiving codetermination as an extraneous 
device with respect to the (necessarily) conflicting logic between capital 
and labour, it ends up disregarding the legal reality of co-determination as 
recognition of the “constitutive” character of capital and labour as the 
founding factors of the firm (as an entity governed by a political 
responsibility functional to the creation of a common good36). In essence, 
the criticism does not take into account the legal nature of the mechanism 
that realizes participation, involving trade unions, works council and 
elections (or appointments) as an element in corporate governance 
regulation, that is, a constitutive-intrinsic element of the company; and 
this mechanism is not just an individual right of the worker but is an 
expression of societal values and such part of the social order. 
If social freedom is identified with the “relationships of recognition” on 
which our life in common is woven, codetermination unequivocally 
represents the paradigm of the achievement of social freedom in the 
economic sphere, and for this reason it must be promoted within the social 
institutions, and in particular in that form of social institution which is the 
enterprise. But in order to promote co-determination, it is necessary to 
mobilize the normative functionalism of which Honnet speaks, through 
supplementary norms that legitimize economic activity through feelings 
(or, if you prefer, values) of solidarity and responsibility. This is the task, 
as we shall now see, of a Europe that must safeguard and revive its social 
model. 
6. The European perspective of board-level worker 
participation. 
                                                        
34 A. Honnet, Freedom’s Rights, p. 237 
35 T. Jütten, Is the market a Sphere of Social Freedom?, p. 199 
36 See Réformer l’entreprise, Entretien avec Oliver Favareau, in Éudes 2018/9, p. 63. 
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It is well known that in the context of EU law there is not a single 
model of participation applicable to all the Member States: the first attempt 
to achieve such a goal through the Draft of the Fifth Directive on Company 
Law was unsuccessful, and was abandoned in 1988. Therefore, board level 
employee representation was left to be determined by the Member States. 
Member States decided to protect existing forms of participation in 
European Companies (SE) (RegulationEC No 2157/2001), European 
Cooperative Society (SCE) (Regulation EC No 1435/2003 and Directive 
2003/72/EC) and in the case of cross-border acquisitions of a limited 
liability company (Directive 2017/1132). A right of worker participation 
was recognized by the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights for Workers according to which “information, consultation and 
participation of workers must be developed along appropriate lines, taking 
account of the practices in force in the various Memeber States” (Article 
17), although it was not included in the 2000 Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, that recognizes only information and 
consultations rights “in the cases and under the conditions provided for by 
the Community law and national laws and practices”.  
However, the right to participate is currently recognized by the 
Praemble of the Treaty (TEU) where it is stated that the Member States 
confirm their attachment to fundamental social right as defined in the 
European Social Charter signed in Turin and in the 1989 Community 
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights for Workers, and by Article 151 
of the Social Chapter of the TFEU: “The Union and the Member States, 
having in mind fundamental social rights such as those set out … in the 
1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Worker”37. 
These measures are subject to collective bargaining agreements and to the 
laws and practices of Member States38. However, one must not forget, or 
underestimate, that pursuant to Article 6 (3) TEU, Fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general 
principles of the Union's law. As for the European Union’s competence to 
                                                        
37 The legal status of the Community Charter is that of a mere political declaration, as stated 
in its preamble, since, due to the opposition of the UK government, the Charter could not be 
integrated into the EC Treaty in 1989. Nonetheless, the preamble to the Treaty on European 
Union confirms the Member States’ ‘attachment to fundamental social rights as defined in the 
1989 Community Charter’, and Article 151 of the Social Chapter of the TFEU: ‘The Union and 
the Member States, having in mind fundamental social rights such as those set out … in the 
1989 Community Charterof the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers…” 
38 See M. F. Dominick, Toward a Community Bill of Rights: The European Community Charter 
of Fundamental Social Rights, in Fordham International Law Journal Volume 14, Issue 3 1990, 
p. 660. 
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legislate in this area, it is offered by art. 153 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which, referring to the 
achievement of the objectives established by art. 151, states that “the 
Union shall support and complement the activities of the member States 
in the following field… (f) representation and collective defence of the 
interest of workers and employers, including codetermination, subject to 
paragraph 5” (which excludes wages, the right of association, the right to 
strike and lockout). 
After a long period of impasse, the European Council has adopted two 
legislative instruments necessary for the creation of the European 
Company, namely the EC Regulation 2157/2001 on the Statute of the SE, 
and the Directive 2001/86/ EC, which complete the Statute as far as the 
involvement of workers in the SE are concerned. However, these tools did 
not produce significant effects. Directive 2001/86, in particular, is limited 
to providing that the establishment of an SE does not entail the 
disappearance or the weakening of the worker participation regime already 
existing in the national law of the companies participating in the 
constitution of an SE. In essence, Member States have only acknowledged 
that they protect existing forms of participation in the formation of an SE 
/ SCE, while in the case in which none of partecipating companies was 
governed by rules allowing the partecipation of workers, there will be no 
duty to establish board-level representation of employees in the SE. 
On this basis, the doctrine has long discussed about the virtues of the 
SE, whose effects in terms of maintaining pre-existing participation rights 
have even been questioned by empirical analysis39, with a divison among 
those who claim that the SE has produced a effect of Europeanization of 
the right to participation40, and those who think that the “before and after” 
principle on which the Directive is based has not produced useful effects41. 
In fact, if on one hand, the principle “before and after” guarantees within 
certain limits the pre-existing participatory rights (the agreement can 
reduce or terminate certain pre-existing rights under national law with a 
2/3 majority vote in the special negotiating body (SE Directive, Art. 4(2) 
(g)), on the other hand, it does not favor the dissemination of the forms of 
institutional involvement of workers in those legal systems in which this 
tradition has not developed. 
                                                        
39 A. Conchon, Board-level employee representation rights in Europe. Facts and Trends, ETUI, 
Brussels, 2011. 
40 See N. Kluge, Workers’ Participation in BASF SE and the European debate on Corporate 
Governance, in Transfer, 2008, 14, p. 127 ff. 
41 See P. Davies, Workers on the Board of the European Company?in Industrial Law Journal, 
2003, 32, p. 75 ff. 
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The substantial failure of the Europeanization of the right of 
participation through the SE, evidenced by a scarce diffusion of SE 
concentrated in the countries of central-northern Europe where the forms 
of organic participation are more rooted, must certainly not be denied. 
However, recognizing the limits of the SE Directive in the promotion and 
diffusion of the right to worker participation in national systems does not 
mean excluding that new attempts can be promoted within the European 
Union, as shown by the numerous resolutions of the European Parliament. 
In recent years, the European Parliament has repeatedly stressed the right 
of workers to be involved in business decisions on issues such as the 
introduction of new technologies, changes in work organization, production 
and economic planning. Finally, with the resolution of 19 January 2017 on 
the European Pillar of Social Rights, the Parliament recalled that the 
involvement of workers in the decision-making process and in the 
management of companies is precious, identifying in the social economy 
enterprises, such as cooperatives, a good example in terms of creating 
quality employment, supporting social inclusion and promoting a 
participatory economy. 
The right to codetermination is therefore not only a “legitimate 
objective”in the light of European Union Law, as recognized by point 17 of 
the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights referred to in art. 
151 (1) TFEU. In the current regulatory framework, it is possible to 
reconstruct the workers’ participation right as an individual fundamental 
social right, that is, a subjective right of the employee. Based on the 
interpretation provided by the Court of Justice in case C-566/15 Erzberger, 
relating to the right of active and passive electorate in the election of 
workers' representatives to the supervisory board of the Companies, it can 
be argued that this fundamental social right, as well as required by art. 17 
of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, falls within the 
scope of “other conditions of work and employment” in Art. 45 (2) TFEU, 
and therefore fully falls within the category of employees' rights according 
to the normative traditions of the Member States. In the Erzberger case, it 
was a matter of deciding whether the national rights that allow workers to 
participate in the boards of directors can legitimately be limited to the 
companies that operate on the national territory, as required by German 
law. According to the Court of Justice, art. 45 TFEU, although it precludes 
any national measure capable of hindering the exercise of the fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the same article, it cannot however guarantee the 
worker transferred to a branch of the company located in another Member 
State the rights relating to his “conditions of employment ”, as required by 
the legislation of the state of origin; consequently that worker loses his 
right of representation on the board of directors. According to the 
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prospectus of the General Advocate, accepted by the Court of Justice, this 
right of representation on the board of directors (as required by German 
law) falls within the concept of “other working conditions” provided for by 
art. 45, 2 TFEU, and therefore constitutes an individual right under the 
TFEU.  
This recognition of the right to participation as an individual right falling 
under the “working condition” is very important, because as it is connected 
to the free circulation it entails the abolition of any discrimination based on 
nationality between workers of the Member States. In connection with the 
provisions of the Community Charter on Social Rights, this recognition 
makes it possible to affirm that in the context of the European Social Model 
the right to participation is a Fundamental Social Right for all employees, 
even if this right is left to the initiative of each Member State to provide 
with a statutory law. In the German case, as stated by the Advocate 
General, the right to co-determination constitutes a “central element of the 
culture of cooperation” typical of that country, and “it constitutes the 
statutory development of the freedom to form and join trade unions and 
permits the exercise of that freedom, which is guaranteed by the 
Grundgesetz (Basic Law)”42. In other words, the legislation that provides 
for the right to participation is a function not only of the interests of 
employees “but rather the general interest, in that it is intended to ensure 
cooperation and integration by also taking into consideration interests that 
go beyond the specific direct interests”43.  
It is evident that in this perspective the right to codetermination, which 
is also legally conceivable as a subjective right of the person, is also (and 
above all) a right to social freedom in the sense previously described. In 
fact, through the participation of workers in the management of 
companies, not only individual freedom is achieved, but the freedom to 
create together (in the community of solidarity) a more equitable and just 
society. This social freedom, as we mentioned, is based on the intrinsic 
social normativity of the economic sphere, on the basis of the mutual 
recognition of subjects as members of a cooperative community. These 
considerations can be applied mutatis mutandis to all national legislation 
that provide for the participation of workers in the management of 
companies, and allow the reconstruction of a model of codetermination 
which, despite being - in the current state of EU law - left to the will of the 
individual Member States, to find a common ubi consistam as a 
fundamental social right which expresses a set of “societal values” and 
traditions of the Member States. Even in those countries, such as Italy, 
                                                        
42 Opinion C-566/15 point 102 
43 Opinion C-566/15 point 103 
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which have not yet implemented a right of workers to participate in the 
management of companies, the horizon of participation as an expression 
of social freedom is well present in the sphere of social and political values 
and choices of the State. It is sufficient to say that the Italian Constitution 
expressly provides for the “right of workers to collaborate, in the ways and 
within the limits established by law, to the management of companies”, 
and this with the aim of “economic and social elevation of work and in 
harmony with the needs of the production” (Article 46 of the Constitution). 
Although not implemented, the constitutional provision expresses a 
powerful normative value, as demonstrated, moreover, by the Delegation 
law 28 June 2012, N. 92, which contains a series of principles for 
supporting participatory industrial relations, inspired by European 
guidelines. In particular, the Delegation law confirms (paragraph 62, letter 
f) that, especially in larger companies (over 300 employees) exercised in 
the form of a joint stock company or SE, where the presence of a 
Management Board and a Supervisory board may be required to represent 
workers on the supervisory board with the same powers as shareholder 
representatives. Finally, the Delegation law provides for (par. 62, letter g) 
the privileged access of employees to the possession of shares in the 
company's capital, directly or through the establishment of bodies 
(foundations, institutions and associations) having as their purpose non-
speculative use of shareholdings and the exercise of collective 
representation in corporate governance. 
In other countries, such as France, where in the private business sector 
codetermination has a very recent legislative origin (2013 and 2015), and 
has developed on the basis of legislation that still leaves the control of the 
company to management and shareholders that dominate boards and thus 
restrict employee representatives’ ability to exert power over strategic 
decisions, employee representatives do not give up: they actively pursue 
strategies aimed at gaining further influence. This shows that the seed of 
participation, once it has taken root, is able to develop vigorously, 
modifying pre-existing models or cultural attitudes of a conflictual nature 
in industrial relations. 
What characterizes Europe is the diversity of institutional models, but 
not the basic idea of participation, which is now present in most legal 
systems. The prospect of a more extensive Europeanization of worker 
participation in corporate governance must therefore be continued with 
conviction, having in mind that it is not just a governance model referable 
to the structure of the company, but a fundamental social right of the 
worker, a right to social freedom.  
While respecting the prudent teaching of those who believed that 
regulation in the context of labour relations must take into account the 
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structures of State and social power and avoid “transplanted” reforms, the 
method of legal comparison makes it possible to enhance the existing 
structures, traditions and values of the social and economic order of the 
Member States, in the direction of a more convinced realization of social 
freedom in the firm and in the society.  
In order to cultivate this project, an interesting starting point can be 
represented by the “scalar” model proposed by the ETUC in 2016. 
According to that proposal, in companies with 50 to 250 workers, 2/3 of 
workers’ representatives should be provided for, in those with 250 to 1000 
1/3 of participation of workers’ representatives, while companies with more 
than 1000 workers should guarantee full equality (1/2 of the seats for 
workers’ representatives). If it is true that this proposal conflicts with the 
models of many Member States, and results as better than the German 
mechanism itself, there is no doubt that this is the paradigm to look at if 
one wants to ponder in terms of a true reform of the firm and of the 
employment relationship, with a view to a more advanced social freedom. 
